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Remembering Reactions and Facts:
The Influence of Subsequent Information
Paula T. Hertel
Trinity University
Memory for reactions and judgments about a biographical passage was· examined
following the presentation of subsequent information relevant to the passage.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that reaction memory shifted as a function of the
type of subsequent information when 3 weeks separated it from the memory test,
but not when testing was immediate or when the information was delivered just
prior to the delayed test. These results were obtained again in Experiment 2 and
contrasted to shifts in memory for· passage facts. Misleading factual information
influenced memory for passage facts most when it was delivered just before the
delayed recognition test. Similar effects occurred in Experiments 3 and 4 despite
changes making the bias and test procedures for reaction and fact memory more
comparable. The different ways that memories for reactions and facts are influ
enced by later information are discussed in terms of the loci of reaction and fact
generation (internal and external).

When reporting memories of events, we to suspect that, in changing our minds, we
often intersperse our reactions to the event influence our abilities to accurately recall
with facts about the event. Within an on those initial reactions. Memory for reactions
going narrative we may inform our audience might therefore be susceptible to interference
about our feelings or judgments regarding and reconstructive effects like those that op
specific aspects of the event, sometimes in an erate in memory for factual information.
A variety ·of experiments have demon
overt fashion ("I was angry that he said that
in front of everyone") and sometimes more strated that memory for selected aspects of
implicitly ("I knew he should have kept his factual information can be influenced or
mouth shut"). Although reactions such as biased by thematically related information
these are sometimes described as products of encountered later (Dooling & Christiaansen,
an affective processing system (Zajonc, 1 980), 1 977; Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1 978; Schus
little is known about affective reactions as tack & Anderson, 1 979; Snyder & Uranow
data within the cognitive system. Even when . itz, 1 978; Spiro, 1 980). The results of many
·reactions are defined as idiosyncratic infer of these experiments have also suggested that
ences within a strictly cognitive system, we the influence increases with the length of the
understand little about how they are remem delay before remembering; an excellent ex
bered. Yet, because later events occur to ample of this increase in influence overtime
modify our initial reactions, it is reasonable is pr:ovided in Spiro's study of passage
memory.
. Experiment 1 was conducted as Experiment 1 of my
After reading a passage about two college
dissertation, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the
students
who fell in love, subjects in Spiro's
PhD degree from the University of New Mexico. The
experiment were incidentally provided with
data from Experiment 1 were reported at the meeting
of the Midwestern Psychological Association, St. Louis,
outcome information about the couple's rela
May 1 980. I am gratful to Linda J. Anooshian, Elizabeth
tionship. Outcome information was either
F. Loftus, Richard M. Shiffrin, and Daniel M. Wegner
consistent
with the end of the passage (e.g.,
for comments on an earlier version of this article, and
to Diane Sausen, Renee Wilson, and Katen Finke for. the outcome of marriage was consistent with
assisting in the collection of data far Experiments 2 and
a passage ending that stressed agreement
3. I give a special nate of thanks to Henry C. Ellis, whose about not having children), or the outcome
advice influenced the direction of this research.
was contradictory (the outcome of a split in
Requests far reprints should be sent to Paula T. Her
the relationship was contradictory to the pas
tel, Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 7 1 5
sage ending on an agreeable note). Some subStadium Drive, San Antonia, Texas 78284.
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jects had been deceived regarding a later test
of passage memory, whereas others believed
they were participating in a typical memory
experiment. Only the former set of instruc
tions led to errors in passage recall of the type
that indicated the influence of the contradic
tory outcome information, and these. errors
occurred following either a 3- or 6-week de
lay, but not after a 2-day delay.
An interesting aspect of Spiro's findings for
the present research on memory for reactions
concerns instructions to deceived subjects.
For these subjects the passage was described
as a true story; they were directed to think
about the story because they would be asked,
ostensibly, to react to it in the second session.'
Spiro believed that these instructions en
couraged the subjects to employ previous
cognitive structures and that only under
those conditions should evidence for an ef
fect of the outcome be found. What appears
equally interesting is that although subjects
were never asked to indicate their reactions,
their later recall may have reflected those re
actions as well as any new reactions resulting
from the outcome information. Further
more, distinguishing between reactions to a
passage and facts from the passage may have
important implications for understanding
the influence of subsequent information on
1
memory.
In the context of passage information, re
actions are defined as overt or covert verbal
responses that �e affectively based and spe
cific to a particular event or type of event
described by the passage. First, reactions may
contain affective components or express
emotions, as do beliefs, judgments, and
impressions (Zajonc, 1 980). Similarly, reac
tions may express inferences about the emo
tions of others, which in turn must be based
on stored information of an affective nature.
Second, the word reaction implies specificity
of the response; the respoQse does not occur
"out of the blue" but in reaction to some
external event. In this sense, the affective
components of reactions may be directly
evoked by the event. As a response, a reaction
must be generated, constructed or made by
the individual. In contrast, facts are not made
but exist independently of individual in
volvement. Facts are objectively verifiable
descriptions of events within the passage.

Thus, reactions and facts both may be stored
in memory, the first as a representation of
how the individual felt or thought (the rep
resentation of a construction), the second as
the representation of an external state of af
fairs. (The representation of a fact may be
"constructed" or elaborated, but not the fact
itself.) Subsequent information may affect
memory for the reaction by evoking some
what different reactions. Subsequent infor
mation may affect memory for facts by stat
ing or inferring competing facts. These sub
sequent reactions or facts may then serve as
sources of interference in attempts to remem
ber the original reactions or facts.
In the following experiments, memory for
reactions to a biographical passage was in
vestigated by varying the type of outcome
information designed to alter reactions. Ex
periment 1 examined the temporal condi
tions for influencing memory for reactions.
As is the case in memory for facts, longer
retention intervals were expected to be as�
sociated with larger effects of subsequent in
formation (cf. Spiro, 1 980). In. addition, the
timing of outcome information within the
interval was also expected to affect accuracy.
Presented immediately prior to the test, ep
isodic memory for the outcome might dif
ferentiate reactions to the outcome from pre
vious reactions. Therefore, outcome infor
mation was_ predicted to affect reaction
memory to a greater extent when a delay sep
arated the outcome bias and the test. In Ex
periment 2, bias effects in memory for re
actions were compared with those in mem
ory for facts from the passage. Finally, in
Experiments 3 and 4 these comparisons were
further explored.
Experiment 1
A general procedure was developed for
measuring reactions and changes in reactions
to information presented in a biographical
passage. The procedure altered Spiro's meth
ods to include an assessment of reactions
(reaction task) following the passage and
prior to the presentation of outcome infor
mation; the recall task was replaced by a task
to assess memory for previous reactions.
Described more completely below, the re
action task required subjects to indicate the
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extent of their agreement with several state
ments about the characters in the passage. As
judged by independent raters, none of the
statements referred only to the biographical
passage information. Instead, they expressed
inferences about the preferences and feeling
of the major character. Two forms of the list
of statements were available and differed
only in the specific wording of the state
ments. One form served as an indicator of
initial reactions; the alternate form was used
to test memory for initial reactions. (Forms
and purposes were counterbalanced.) In the
memory task, subjects were instructed to in
dicate memory for their initial reactions,
rather than reacting anew. Statements in the
reaction task were designed to be sensitive
to changes in reactions resulting from one of
two types of biasing outcomes, presented af
ter the original reaction task. The retention
interval and locus of the putcome delivery
within the interval were each varied in order
to assess previously discussed notions of the
time required to accommodate reactions to
the outcome.

Method
Materials. The biographical passage used in all con
ditions of the experiment (see Appendix) described cer
tain aspects of the life of a hypothetical person, Donna
Madison, including her schooling, marriage, husband,
children, and hobbies. The passage was constructed to
be relatively neutral with respect to each of two out
comes, which in turn corresponded to either a traditional
or a nontraditional role for women.
For the reaction task, two lists of 14 statements were
constructed. The Appendix provides examples. A scale
was provided at the top of each form, indicating judg
ments of certainly true (I) to certainly false (6). For each
form, half of the statements were designed to receive low
ratings from a traditional point of view ("She values her
role as wife and mother above all "), whereas the other
half would deserve low ratings from a nontraditional
view ("Donna probably feels that her husband has suc
ceeded at her expense"). The direction of the rating was
reversed for each statement on the alternate form. Ap..
proximately equal numbers of positive and negative
statements were distributed within each half of each
form. In general, Form I was constructed to avoid ex
traneous preferenCes of any kind, and Form 2 contained
reversals (affirmation or negation) of statements on
Form I. Statement order was randomized.
Uniform scores for the reaction task were obtained
by inverting the ratings for nontraditional statements on
each form (I became 6, 2 became 5, . . . , 6 became 1).
The inverted ratings were then summed with the non
inverted ratings; high scores reflected a nontraditional
reaction and low scores a traditional reaction.
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Subjects and design. Nine volunteers from introduc
tory psychology classes participated in each of the 12
cells of the factorial design. Factors were bias-test con
dition (immediate bias and immediate test [II], imme
diate bias and delayed test [IDJ, or delayed bias and
delayed test [DD]), bias type (traditional or nontradi
tional), and initial reaction form (I or 2). Subjects were
required to return for the second session 3 weeks after
the first session regardless of test condition, in order to
obtain credit in their courses. Those who failed to return
were evenly distributed across conditions and were re
placed by additional subjects. Approximately equal
numbers of each sex participated within conditions.
Procedure. The order and conditions for the proce
dures in Experiments I and 2 are shown in Table I. At
the beginning of the initial session, subjects were told
that they were participating in two short studies, the
second of which had been delayed for 3 weeks because
of a failure to receive all the materials. The first session
was described as part of a study about reactions to real
world events as they normally occur outside an exper
imental setting; for this reason a true story about real
people would be used. Subjects were allowed 5 minutes
to read and think about the prose passage, and another
10 minutes to complete the reaction forms. This con
stituted the acquisition phase for all conditions.
Following the collection of reaction forms, the ex
perimenter initiated a pseudo-debriefing session by men
tioning that the story had been written about 4 years
ago by a graduate student in sociology who was a friend
of both the experimenter and the woman in the story.
The name of the woman had, of course, been changed.
The student had simply wanted to get an idea of how
university students would react to various kinds of social
information. Recently, she had contacted the experi
menter, requesting the collection of more data, because
she wanted to find out if various kinds of social changes
had occurred on this campus. At this point, subjects in
the delayt;d-bias condition (DD) were dismissed, whereas
those in the immediate-bias conditions (II and ID) re
ceived biasing information. Subjects selected to hear the
traditional bias were told, "In case you'd like to know
what happened to the woman in the story, my friend
mentioned that she recently had another baby and was
really enjoying it. The other kids were ge{ting so big and
she had missed having a baby in the house. " Subjects
slated for the nontraditional bias heard, "In case you'd
like to know what has happened to the woman in the
story, my friend mentioned that shortly after the story
had been written, the woman went back and finished
her B.A. She is now a graduate student in physiological
psychology in California and she is looking for a research
position."
Following delivery of the bias, subjects in the ID con
dition were dismissed, whereas those in the II condition
were tested, with the alternate reaction form, before the
session was terminated. Instructions for this condition
were as follows:
There is one more task to do today. I have another
form, similar to the one you just filled out. I want to
make sure that the two forms do not differ. Please try
to remember your initial reactions while completing
the first form, and base your responses to this form
on that memory only. Do not rely on your memory
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for the numbers you chose because this form is worded
differently and will not be scored the same. Save your
questions until the end, so that you do not influence
the way others respond.
During the second sessio n, subjects in the II condition
were debriefed, those in the ID condition were tested
and debriefed, and those in the .tiD condition received
the bias, were tested, and debriefed. In the DD condition,
delivery of the bias occurred following the second sen
tence of the delayed-test instructions. The bias was mod
ified to indicate that the experimenter had just spoken
with the sociology graduate student. These instructions

were identical to the immediate-test instructions follow
ing a more appropriate introduction:
The materials for the second study never have arrived,
but I have come up with a second �k for you to do.
Do you remember the story you read last time? (Bias
for DD condition: Oh, by the way. . . . ) Now, I want
you to take a minute to remember your reactions to
that story. I have another form, similar to the one you
filled out last time. I want to make ,sure that the two
forms do not differ. Please try to remember your ini
tial reactions while completing the first form.

Table l
Order of Procedures in Each Bias-Test Condition for Experiments 1 and 2
Bias-test condition
Session

Immediate-immediate

Immediate-delay

Delay-delay

Experiment I
Read and React
(FORM 1 or FORM 2)

Read and React
(FORM 1 or FORM 2)

Bias (TRADITIONAL or
NONTRADITIONAL)

Bias (TRADITIONAL or
NONTRADITIONAL)

Read and react
(FORM 1 or FORM 2)

Reaction memory test
2

Return only

Reaction memory test

Bias (TRADITIONAL or
NONTRADITIONAL)
Reaction memory test

Experiment 2
Read and react

Read and react

Extra statements (CONSISTENT/
MISLEADING)

Extra statements (CONSISTENT/
MISLEADING)

Bias (TRADITIONAL/
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE)

Bias (TRADITIONAL/
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE)

Read and react

Reaction memory test
Recognition test
Debriefing
2

Return only

Reaction memory test

Extra statements (CONSISTENT/
MISLEADING)

Recognition test

Bias (TRADITIONAL/
NONTRADITIONAL/NONE)

Debriefing

Reaction memory test
Recognition test
Debriefing

Note. Conditions of all between-groups factors in the design are indicated in uppercase letters. Subjects hearing the
consistent extra statements received 'either the traditional or the nontraditional reaction bias; subjects hearing the
'
misleading extra statements did not receive a reaction bias (NONE).
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Results and Discussion
A three-way analysis of variance indicated
no reliable differences among conditions in
initial reactions to the story. In order to eval
uate memory effects, difference scores were
computed by subtracting the initial reaction
score from the test score. Since high reaction
scores indicated a nontraditional view, pos
itive difference scores reflected change in the
direction of the nontraditional bias. Simi
larly, negative difference scores reflected
change in the direction of the traditional
view. 1
A three-way analysis of variance in differ
ence scores· did not reveal a significant main
effect of test form. Nor did interactions of
test form with the other factors reach signif
icance. Therefore, the data were collapsed
across the test-form factor. For the following
analyses, values of p < .05 were considered
reliable, and MSe 21.79.
The r((sults clearly demonstrated an effect
of outcome information on memory for pre
vious reactions. Table 2 presents the mean
difference scores for each bias type and bias
test condition. The effect of the bias was
much greater for the ID condition than for
the other two bias-test conditions. This result
is supported by the reliable interaction of bia�
type with the planned comparison ofiD con
dition versus II and DD conditions, F(1,
96) 6. 4-3. The overall interaction of bias
type with bias-test condition was also reli
able, F(2, 96) 3.22, as was the main effect
of bias type, F(l , 96) 19.26. In or(ler to
determine the conditions for which the bias
effect occurred, analyses of simple main ef
fects were performed. The bias reliably af
fected difference scores for the ID condition
only, F(l, 96) 21.21; after 3 weeks the na
ture of the outcome information was re
flected in the subjects' attempts to remember
how they had reacted initially. The direction
of difference scores in the DD condition was
not predicted and perhaps indicated a general
forgetting factor. However, many subjects
accurately reproduced their original reaction
scores.
=

=

=

=

=

Experiment 2
·Memory for reactions appears to be vul
nerable to interference from related infor-

Table 2·
Mean Difference Scores for Each Combination
of Bias Type and Bias-Test Condition
(Experiment 1) ·
Bias-test condition
Bias type

II

ID

DD

Traditional
Nontraditional
Bias effect

- 1.39
1.00
2.39

-3.78
3.39
7. 17

-.78
1.50
2.28

Note. Means were computed on the scores of 18 subjects.
II = Immediate-immediate; ID = Immediate-delay;
DD = Delay-delay.

mation in ways that may correspond to the
effect of intervening materials on memory
for facts. Certainly the results of Experiment
1 were consistent with the effects obtained
in Spiro's study of passage memory, even
though the latter did not include a condition
in which outcome information was delivered.
immediately prior to the delayed recall tests�
Delayed-bias conditions, however, were in
cluded in two separate investigations of fac
tual memory, one a series of experiments by
Lqftus et al. (1978) and the other the research
of Dooling and Christiaansen (1977).
Loftus et al. presented slides of an auto
pedestrian accident, followed by a verbal bias
either immediately or after various delays
associated with the timing of the retention
test. The subsequent bias, contained in a
questionnaire about the accident, was de
signed to be misleading or consistent with
respect to the original event. If a stop sign
was present in the slides, for example, mis
leading information implied the existence of
1 Note that in the absence of bias effects, difference
scores of a �ontrivial magnitude should indicate some
form of general forgetting. As such, they might be ex
pected to regress toward the mean value of reaction
scores and produce a mean difference score around zero.
However, the predicted results should not be con
founded by a possible effect of regression toward the
mean because initial reactions did not reliably differ
across conditions. If subjects hearing a nontraditional
bias happened to have produced a more traditional ini
tial reaction mean, for example, a change in the direction
of the nontraditional bias would also be considered a
change in the , direction of the overall initial reaction
mean. Mean reaction scores on the memory task were
predicted to change in the opposite direction from the
mean.

.
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a yield sign. Errors involving false recogni
tion of the yield sign increased with the
length of the retention interval, but the larg
est effect always occurred when the mislead
ing information was presented ill1mediately
prior to testing.
A different approach to examining bias
effects was taken by Dooling and Christiaan
sen (1977). Like Loftus et al., they temporally
varied the presentation of the bias within the
retention interval. However, unlike the re
sults of Loftus et al., their results indicated
a larger bias effect when the bias was deliv
ered 1 week prior to testing. Noting this dif
ference, Dooling and Christiaansen suggested
that their bias (providing a famous-person
name for the previous fictitious passage) may
have required "an active cognitive reorga
nization" of information in memory for the
passage. Such a reconstruction is cleaJly not
required by the introduction of the yield sign
in the experiments of Loftus et al. Further
more, presenting a famous-person name
(Adolf Hitler or Helen Keller) may have en
listed structures for storing affective reactions
and impressions, untapped by misleading in
ferences concerning traffic signs. The name
bias possibly pertained to complex memory
structures; the sign bias affected representa
tions for specific aspects of an event. These
differences suggest that the mechanisms of
influencing memory for reactions might dif
fer from those affecting memory for · facts.
Yet the modalities for presenting the to-be
remembered events and the biases also dif
fered across the studies.
In Experiment 2, misleading information
designed to influence memory for facts, or
outcome information designed to affect
memory for reactions, was orally presented
following the same prose passage. All subjects
were tested for reaction memory and fact re
cognition.· If different patterns of results were
obtained for the two memory measures, the
alternative explanation of modality differ
ences would be eliminated, and differing
mechanisms for change still suspected.

Method
Materials. The prose passage and biasing informa
tion from Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2.
However, forms for the reaction tasks were shortened
to eight statements, preserVing the controls for possible

extraneous preferences described in Experiment 1. State
ments were omitted if they were reported as ambiguous
in informal discussions with subjects or if the negation
was structurally awkward. Additional items were elim
inated to preserve the traditional/nontraditional bal
ance. Two random orderings of the resulting two forms
were used.
As a context for providing the bias regarding memory
for passage facts, three additional reaction statements
were composed. The first statement (Statement 1 below)
did not introduce misleading information or repeat orig
inal information; it served as a buffer to avert any sus
picion of a bias manipulation. The remaining two state
ments varied according to condition of fact bias. State
ment 2a was consistent with the passage, which reported
Donna's interest in contemporary furniture, whereas
statement 2b provided misleading information about
antiques. Similarly, Statement 3a repeated that Donna
had three children (consistent), whereas Statement 3b
implied that she had only two (misleading). Misleading
statements did not directly oppose original information,
as did the yield sign in Loftus et al.'s experiments. How
ever, they suggested events in ways that were not entirely
compatible with the corresponding details of the passage;
for example, we would not consider whether Donna
would like to have more than two children, unless we
inferred that she had two or fewer. And, at least for those
who might agree that she liked to visit antique stores,
Statement 2b might presuppose an interest in antiques.

I. Donna enjoys spending her time fixing up their

house.
2a. Visiting furniture stores is one of her favorite pas
times.
2b. Visiting antique stores is one of her favorite pastimes.
3a. She would like to have more than three children.
3b. She would like to have more than two children.

The recognition test for passage facts consisted of eight
two-alternative forced-choice items. Within each item,
the target, a semantically accurate statement of passage
information, was paired with an inaccurate distractor;
for example, "She was a history major in college" served
as a distractor for the statement that her major was En
glish. Neutral items, irrelevant to the reaction state
ments, occupied the first five positions and the eighth
position on the list. They are listed in the Appendix. For
Items 6 and 7, distractors referred to the misleading re
action statements described above. These distractors,
with target information in parentheses, were the
following:

6. Donna and Charles have two (three) children.
7. She has taken decorating courses and knows a lot
about antique (contemporary) furniture.
Targets and distractors were presented in an order ran
domly determined for each pair. A second list of the
eight pairs differed from the original in that the within
pair order was reversed.
The fin� "debriefing" form used in Experiment 2
contained an explanation of the manipulation concern
ing memory for facts, following a technique employed
by Loftus et al. ( 1978), and instructions to identify which
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information was presented in the passage and which was
presented in an additional reaction statement. The de
briefing form contained the following information re
garding Donna's interest in furniture. (The bias con
cerning number of children was similarly revealed.)
The study in which you have just been involved was
designed to determine the effects of subsequent in
formation on memory. In the beginning you read a
story which stated that Donna knew a lot about either
antique or contemporary furniture. Later you were
asked to react to a statement about shopping at either
antique or at furniture stores. Please indicate which
information you were given at each point
I read about

I reacted to
a statement about

antique furniture
contemporary furniture .

antique stores
furniture stores

Subjects and design. Sixteen female volunteers from
general psychology classes participated in each of the
nine cells of the design. Factors were bias-test condition
(II, ID, or DO) and bias type (traditional, nontraditional,
or misleading). Subjects hearing either of the reaction
biases (traditional or nontraditional) received only con
sistent information in the additional reaction statements,
and thus they served as controls for assessing the bias
effects for facts. Subjects who heard the misleading bias
for facts received no bias regarding outcome information
and served as controls for the reaction bias. Forms for
the reaction and recognition tasks were counterbalanced
within each cell of the design. Course credit was again
made contingent upon second-session attendance; all
but two subjects returned and those were replaced.
Procedure. For subjects receiving the traditional or
nontraditional reaction bias, all procedures in Experi
ment 1 were repeated in Experiment 2, augmented by
the following. (Refer to Table 1 for a summary.) First,
either immediately after the initial reaction task (II and
ID conditions) or at the start of the second session (DD
condition), the experimenter mentioned that three state
ments had been mistakenly omitted before duplicating
the reaction forms and would now be read. Subjects were
instructed to listen to each statement but to write only
the number chosen to indicate the extent of agreement
or disagreement with each statement. The three consis
tent statements (1, 2a, and 3a above) were then read.
Responses were written at the bottom of the reaction
forms by II and 'ID subjects and on a blank sheet of
paper by DO subjects. Those in the DD condition were
asked to take a minute to recall their general reactions
before the statements were read, and they were provided
with a judgment scale written on the chalkboard. After
responses to the additional statements were collected,
one of the two reaction biases was delivered.
The remaining addition to the procedures of Exper
iment 1 consisted of the recognition memory test, which
followed the second reaction task in all groups, and was
in turn followed by the debriefing task. The instruction
for the recognition task was to choose the sentence from
each pair which more accurately reflected information
they read in the passage. The debriefing form was dis
tributed without comment.

Table

3

Mean Difference Scores for Each Combination
ofBias Type and Bias-Test Condition
(Experiment 2)
Bias-test condition
Bias type

II

ID

DD

Traditional
Nontraditional
Control (misleading
fact bias)
Bias effect

-.19
.63

-1.94
2.25

-.13
2.50

1.06
.82

.56
4.19

1.69
2.63

Note. The bias effect is determined by subtracting the
mean in the traditional condition from the correspond
ing mean in the nontraditional condition. The effect of
misleading information, designed to bias memory for
facts but not reactions, can be assessed by comparing
the control group means to the midpoints of the tradi
tional and nontraditional means. Means are computed
on difference scores from 16 subjects. II
Immediate
immediate; ID Immediate-delay; DO Delay-delay.
=

=

=

Treatment of subjects in the three bias-test conditions
who received the misleading bias for passage detail dif
fered from the above only in the following ways. First,
the additional statements consisted of the buffer state
ment followed by the two misleading statements (1, 2b,
and 3b above). Second, no outcome information was
provided to bias their memory for reactions.

Results
Memory for reactions. Table 3 provides
the mean difference between the reaction
memory score and the original reaction score
for each cell in the design. Although the bias
effect in this experiment was weaker than the
corresponding effect in Experiment 1 , as
demonstrated by the lack of a reliable inter
action of bias type with bias-test condition,
the same pattern holds: The simple main
effect of the bias was reliable only for subjects
who heard the bias 3 weeks prior to the de
layed memory test, F(2, 1 35) 4.507, MSe
1 8.496. As in Experiment 1 , initial. reaction
scores did not reliably differ among condi
tions. Nor did misleading information re
garding facts lead to reliable changes in mem
ory for reactions across the bias-test condi
tions.
Recognition of facts. Table 4 presents
mean percentage correct recognition for
Neutral Items 1-� and 8 and Biased Items
6,and 7. All subjects who heard outcome in=

=

·
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Table

4

Mean Percentage Correct Recognition of Neutral
and Biased Items as a Function of Bias Type
and Bias-Test Condition (Experiment 2)
Bias-test condition
Items/bias
Neutral
Consistent bias
Misleading bias
Biased
Consistent bias
Misleading bias

II

lD

DD

95.8
96.9

78.1
78.1

78.6
79.2

stood to partially re'flect a reliable interaction
of bias type with a linear trend in bias-test
condition for biased items only, F(1, 135)
9.123, MSe .088. It is clear that the effect
of misleading information depended on both
the delay of the bias and the d�lay ofthe test.
In contrast,. correct recognition of neutral
items was uninfluenced by misleading infor
mation and reliably differed according to
bias-test condition only, F(2, 135) 22.829,
MSe
.022; percentage correct recognition
fell as the retention interval increased.
Judgments, on the debriefi ng form. Table
5 presents the pattern of judgments on the
debriefing form, broken down according to
whether the subject had correctly or incor
rectly recognized the item on the recognition
test. The fifth row indicates, for example, that
out of th� 32 subjects in the delayed consis
tent-bias condition, 24 correctly recognized
Item 6, and 91.7% of those 24 were correct
again on the debriefing form; 88.2% of the
17 correct on Item 7 were also correct on the
debriefing form. Continuing along the fifth
row, all 8 of those who were incorrect on
Item 6 and 67.7 of the 15 who were incorrect
on Item 7 corrected themselves on the de
briefing form; after reading about the nature
of the experimental manipulation, these sub
jects indicated that they had "really" read
that Donna had three children or that she
was interested in contemporary furniture. In
a sense, the debriefing form may have served
as a reminder for these subjects. However,
when subjects who heard the misleading bias
after the delay (the last row of Table 5) were
=

=

=

=

65.6
37.5

87.5
84.4

64.1
18.8

Note. The data of 16 subjects contributed to each mis

leading-bias mean. Means for consistent-bias groups
were combined from the traditional and nontraditional
reaction-bias groups and were therefore based on 32 sub
jects each. Percentage correct recognition was computed
on six neutral items and two biased items. II = Imme
diate-immediate; ID = Immediate-delay; DD = Delay
delay.

formation to bias reactions were given con
sistent information regarding facts. Since rec
ognition differences between traditional and
nontraditional outcome groups were not re
liable and did not reliably interact with the
other factors, the data from these groups were
combined into a consistent-bias category.
An analysis of variance, with between-sub
jects factors of bias type (consistent or mis
leading) and bias-test conditions (II, ID, or
DD) and the within-subjects factor of item
type (neutral or biased), revealed a reliable
three-way interaction, F(2, 125)
4.151,
. MSe
.112. This interaction can be under=

=

'

Table

5

Percentage Correct on Debriefing Form For Recognition Items 6 and 7 (Experiment 2)
Correct recognition
Bias-test condition
Immediate-immediate
Consistent bias
Misleading bias
Immediate-delay
Consistent bias
Misleading bias
Delay-delay
Consistent bias
Misleading bias

Incorrect recognition

Item 7

Item 6

96.6(29)
100.0(14)

96.3(27)
92.3(13)

66.7(3)
0 (2)

60.0 (5)
0 (3)

32
16

100.0(24)
80.0 (5)

94.4(18)
100.0(7)

87.5(8)
9.1(11)

64.3(14)
11.1(9)

32
16

91.7 (24)
66.7(3)

88.2(17)
100�0(3)

100.0(8)
15.4(13)

67.7(15)
23.1(13)

n

Item 6

32
.16

Item 7

Note. The number of correct or incorrect responses on the recognition item is provided within parentheses. In each
case,

percentage correct on the debriefing form was computed on this number.
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provided with the same reminder and expla
nation, only 15
. .4% of the errors on Item 6
and 23.1% of errors on Item 7 were corrected
(changed on debriefing form). In general, the
last two columns of Table 5 show that most
recognition errors by subjects hearing the
consistent bias were corrected after debrief
ing but that only 7 of a total of 51 errors in
misleading-bias conditions were corrected.

Discussion
Results concerning memory for reactions
essentially provide a replication of Experi
ment l; the bias effect occurred only for the
ID condition. Differences between bias types
appeared smaller than in Experiment l; this
perhaps reflects the decrease in the number
of items on the reaction sheet or gender dif
ferences. (Subject availability dictated that
only women participated in Experiment 2.)
However, the more important point is that
�he pattern of results remained the same.
In contrast, a very different pattern of re
sults emerged from the recognition test. Mis
leading 'information influenced memory for
passage facts after the 3-week delay and to
a greater extent when it was provided im
mediately before the delayed recognition test.
These results, obtained from a verbal bias for
verbal material, are very similar to the results
of Loftus et al. (1978). Both sets of results
concern memory for factual details, influ
enced by implications of inconsistent infor
mation. We all know, for example, that stop
signs and yield signs do not share the same
corners at intersections. Nor do people have
two children and three children (unless they
have five children). And, to some extent, peo
ple preferring contemporary furniture do not
search for antiques. When compared with the
effects on memory for reactions,· these sub
stitutional bias effects appear much more
straightforward or direct. Moreover, rather
than amounting to response bias effects, the
recognition changes appear to occur on a
memorial level, as demonstrated by debrief
ing data in Experiment 2 and in the research
of Loftus et al.
In the debriefing task of Experiment 2,
very few of the recognition errors made by
subjects hearing the misleading statements
were corrected after the nature of the rna-

·
nipulation was explained. These subjects
were probably no more willfully tenacious in
their errors than others (who most often
chose the correct information on the second
try). Instead their confirmed errors may sug
gest that correct information was no longer
accessible. It is also important to notice that
this tendency not to correct the error was at
least as strong in the immediate-bias, de
layed-test condition, in which only 2 of 20
errors were corrected after debriefing com
pared with 5 of 26 errors in the delayed-bias,
·
delayed-test condition. The effect of the im
mediate bias similarly cannot be attributed
to confusion.
Finally, obtaining a larger bias effect in the
·delayed-bias condition cannot be attributed·
solely to a general decline in passage mem
ory. If such a decline invited use of tlte recent
bias, it would do so differentially for Items
6 and 7. Item 6 has higher overall recognition
than Item 7 (see Table 5), yet the effect of
misleading information is the same. In ad
dition, a general decline should encourage
use of the delayed consistent bias to boost
recognition accuracy in the DO condition.
Yet accuracy did not improve over the ID
condition. Although the latter result is puz
zling, it denies that the bias effect in the DO
condition resulted only from poor passage
memory.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, several aspects of the
methodology for investigating memory for
reactions differed from the corresponding
aspects in studying memory for facts. Before
much can be said regarding the possibility of
different mechanisms in remembering reac
tions and facts, some of the extraneous as
pects of the tasks must be examined. Without
pretending to equate the two sets of proce
dures, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed
to make the procedures somewhat more
comparable.
In Experiment 2, instructions to remem
ber original reactions may have alerted sub
jects to disregard subsequent reactions to a
greater extent than instructions to remember
the story suggested disregarding subsequent
"facts." This possible difference in emphasis
might contribute to an alternative explana-
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tion for the different patterns of results within
delayed-bias, delayed-test conditions when
bias and memory instructions were presented
contiguously. Differing degrees of episodic
distinctiveness of the bias, established through
test instructions, could account for the ab
sence versus the presence of bias effects in
the DD conditions. Accordingly, one pur
pose in conducting Experiment 3 was to vary
the emphasis of disregarding subsequent in
formation in remembering passage facts. If
subjects who are explicitly directed to ignore
possibly faulty references to passage facts still
make recognition errors based on misleading
statements, then episodic distinctiveness be
comes less important as a rival explanation
for reaction and fact 'differences.
The second line of reasoning leading to
Experiment 3 involved the respective natures
of the memory, tests. Specifically, the test of
memory for reactions appeared to require
greater retrieval efforts than did the two-al
ternative recognition test for facts. Not only
were there six alternative ratings, but the
choice with respect to any particular item
had to be based partially on memory for a
more general reaction because the original
item was worded differently. In short, re
membering reactions may have been made
more complex a task than remembering
facts. And since the reaction memory test
cannot be converted to a two-alternative,
forced-choice recognition task without losing
all sensitivity, a cued-recall test of memory
for facts was included as part of the proce
dures of Experiment 3. The cued-recall task
is clearly more similar to the reaction mem
ory task in the amount of information that
must be retrieved than is the recognition task.

Method
A total of 128 volunteers from general psychology
classes participated in the three-factor design, 16 in each
combination of bias timing (immediate or delayed), bias
type (consistent or misleading), and instructions (pre
vious memory instructions or explicit instructions to
ignore all intervening references to story facts). An ad
ditional group of 16 subjects served as a no-bias control,
to assess the possible facilitative effect of repeating details
in the consistent-bias conditions.
The material and procedures of Experiment 2 were
employed and modified in the following ways. Imme
diate-test conditions were omitted, and all conditions
were tested after the 3-week delay. No outcome infor
mation was provided to bias memory for reactions, al-

though the reaction task was used in the first session as
a rationale for the experiment and the reaction memory
task was used in the second session to assess memory
without the intervening reaction bias. The additional
reaction items again provided the context for presenting
the consistent or misleading bias for facts; they were read
at the end of the first session (immediate bias) or at the
beginning of the second· session (delayed bias). Then,
following the reaction memory test, a cued-recall test of
memory for facts preceded the recognition test.
The cued-recall task was introduced with instructions
that either duplicated the recognition instructions in
Experiment 2 or stressed the importance of ignoring in
tervening material, as did memory-for-reaction instruc
tions in Experiment 2. In the first case, subjects were
asked to remember details from the story and to provide
an answer to each question, guessing if all else failed. In
the second case, more explicit instructions stated that
subjects should base their answers to the questions on
their memories of the passage only and should not be
influenced by any references to passage information oc
curring in the meantime. The recall test consisted of
eight questions, corresponding to the.content and order
of items on the recognition test. Questions 1-5 and 8
are listed in the Appendix. Questions concerning biased
facts were the following:
6. How many children do Donna and Charles have?
7. What kind of furniture does Donna know a lot
about?
Finally, the recognition test was preceded by repeated
instructions appropriate to each condition but was mod
ified to describe the forced-choice procedure. It was fol
lowed by the debriefing form.
In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition
read and reacted to the passage, heard the consistent or
misleading extra statements, waited 3 weeks, then re
turned for a reaction memory test, a recall test, recog
nition, and debriefing. Subjects in the delayed-bias con
dition did everything in the above order with one ex
ception. They waited 3 weeks before hearing the extra
statements, instead of after. In both conditions of bias
timing, instructions for the recall and recognition test
varied between subjects (see Table 6).
·

Results and Discussion
Recognition. Table 7 presents averaged
correct recognition ofltems 6 and 7, in each
combination of bias timing, bias type, and
instructions. A three-way analysis ofvariance
revealed a reliable interaction of timing with
type, F( l , 120) 3.800, MSe
.403,2 which
indicates that the misleading bias had a larger
effect when it was presented just prior to the
delayed test. This outcome replicated the rec
ognition results in Experiment 2. However,
=

=

2 The error term is appropriate for analyses performed
on numbers of responses, rather than the percentage
measure.
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the instructions factor did not reliably inter Table 7
act with either timing or type, or produce a Mean Percentage Correct Recognition of Biased
reliable effect alone. In fact, the pattern of Items (Experiment 3)
means presented in the lower half of Table
Bias timing
7 (instructions to ignore) closely resembles
that above (previous instruc�ions). Although
Instructions/bias
Immediate
Delayed
failure to reject the hypothesis of no differ
ences is just that, it must be noted that the Previous instructions
Consistent bias
50.0
50.0
episodic distinctiveness of the bias remains
Misleading bias
43.7
18.8
unsupported as an alternative explanation of Instructions to ignore
Consistent bias
53.2
56.3
the reaction-versus-facts differences. This is
Misleading bias
18.8
40.6
the case because instructions more similar to
those used in the reaction memory task Note. Each mean is based on the data from 16 subjects,
yielded results typical of the memory-for and percentages are based on two responses per subject.
facts effect.
Unreported in Table 7, the mean per
centage correct recognition in the no-bias
Recall. Table 8 presents the mean per
control group was 56.3; a comparison with centage ofcorrect answers to Questions 6 and
performance in conditions receiving a con 7. Again, a three-way analysis of variance
sistent bias indicates no facilitative effect of showed a reliable interaction of timing with
repetition in the consistent conditions. The type, F(l, 1 20) 9.899, MSe .285 (see
lack of a recognition advantage in the de Footnote 2). In addition, when the data were
layed consistent-bias condition may indicate scored for number of errors reflecting the
that "contemporary furniture" is a difficult misleading bias, this interaction was again
detail to remember and one that gets no obtained, F( 1 , 1 20) 8.634, MSe .497; the
boost from the consistent statement: Visiting greater number of recall errors was produced
furniture stores is one of her favorite pas by those subjects who heard misleading in
formation, especially if it was delivered just
times.
=

=

=

Table

=

6

Order of Procedures in Bias Timing Conditions in Experiments 3 and 4
Bias timing
Session

Immediate

Delay
Experiment 3

2

Read and react
Extra statements (CONSISTENT/MISLEADING)

Read and react

Reaction memory test
Recall test (PREVIOUS/IGNORE)
Recognition test
Debriefing

Extra statements (CONSISTENT/MISLEADING)
Reaction memory test
Recall test (PREVIOUS/IGNORE)
Recognition test
Debriefing
Experiment 4

2

Read and react
Bias'(TRADITION"'L or NONTRADITIONAL)

Read and react

Reaction test (MEMORY/NEW REACTIONS)
Recognition test
Debriefing

Bias (TRADITIONAL or NONTRADITIONAL)
Reaction test (MEMORY/NEW REACTIONS/DISGUISED)
Recognition test
Debriefing

Note. Conditions of all between-groups factors in the design are indicated in uppercase letters.
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Table 8
Mean Percentage Correct (and Percentage
of Bias Errors) in Recall of Biased Items
(Experiment 3)
Bias timing

T. HERTEL

amount of change in the direction of the tra
ditional bias is perhaps built into the design
of the reaction task methodology.
Experiment 4

In Experiment 3, instructions to remem
ber facts were varied with respect to their
Previous instructions
explicit reference to biasing information, yet
34.4 (37.5)
Consistent bias
25.0 (40.6)
differential
effects on recall or recognition
9.5 (7 1.9)
40.6 (37.5)
Misleading bias
Instructions to ignore
were not obtained. In Experiment 4, the op
40.6 (28.2)
34.4 (28.2)
Consistent bias
posite approach was taken in attempting to
12.5 (68.8)
Misleading bias
37.5 (34.4)
make instructions with regard to the bias
Note. Means are computed on 16 subjects per condition, comparable for reactions and facts. Previous
and percentages are based on two responses (to Ques (Experiment 2) instructions to remember ini
tions 6 and 7) per subject. Mean percentage of responses tial reactions clearly oriented subjects to dis
scored as errors that reflected the misleading bias is pre
regard any reactions to outcome informa
sented parenthetically.
tion, and these instructions were repeated in
the memory instructions condition of Ex
periment 4. However, in another instructions
before the test. These effects on the number condition, disguised bias, the biasing out
of correct responses and the number of come information was presented as part of
biased errors did not depend on the instruc instructions to remember initial reactions.
tions factor, which did not reliably interact This approach obviously could be used only
with either timing or type alone. Nor did the in the delayed-bias condition, but it appeared
instructions factor produce a reliable main to be the only reasonable way both to mimic
effect. In short, the pattern of recall errors the deceptive conditions for biasing memory
was similar to the pattern of recognition re for facts and to specify that the task was to
sults and thereby does not encourage serious remember reactions, rather than to react
consideration of complexity of the memory anew. In this condition of instructions, sub
task as an alternative explanation of the re jects were not alerted that biasing informa
action-versus-facts effects.
tion was novel or clearly different from pas
Debriefing and m emory for reactions. sage information. In a similar fashion, sub
Debriefing data were again examined to de jects in previous experiments had not been
termine the number of correct responses on �erted that misleading factual information
the debriefing form as a function of the cor was different from corresponding passage
redness of recognition. These results were facts.
similar to those obtained in Experiment 2.
Two additional aspects of Experiment 4
Moreover, they did not reliably vary accord concerned the nature of the reaction task and
ing to the condition of instructions. Of the the validity of the memory measure. First,
subjects who heard misleading information additional subjects in each condition of bias
and allowed it to affect recognition perfor timing and bias type �ere asked to indicate
mance (incorrect recognition), none in the their current reactions to story information
immediate-bias condition rectified the error during the second session. These second re
on the debriefing form. Three of the 52 errors actions were designed to serve a comparative
in the delayed misleading condition were cor function regarding the memory scores. In
rected, two of them under explicit instruc particular, it was assumed in previous ex
tions to ignore the bias.
periments that outcome information would
Finally, three-way analyses of variance necessarily modify reactions; if this were not
were performed on the original reaction true, it would be difficult to understand the
scores and on the difference scores. No reli regularities in the difference score data. An
able effects were obtained with either mea other problem in interpreting the difference
sure. The grand mean of the difference scores scores would result if, in contrast, new re
was .932, a result indicating that some action scores would tum out to be much difInstructions/bias

Immediate

Delayed
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ferent from the initial reactions-if, for ex
ample, they changed in an opposite directipn
from that predicted for each bias type.
Finally, the procedure in Experiment 4 in
cluded a manipulation check in the form of
a final debriefing questionnaire. Subjects
were asked to indicate the most recent in
formation they had received about the woman
in the story; greater inaccuracy was expected
from the disguised-bias condition.

Method
The nature of the disguised-bias condition of the in
structions precluded crossing all three levels of instruc
tions (memory, new reactions, and disguised bias) with
the bias timing factor. pisguised-bias instructions were
administered in the delayed�bias condition of timing
only, but for both traditional and nontraditional types
of bias. In the nontraditional condition, for example,
disguised-bias instructions to remember initial reactions
were as follows:
The first thing we want you to do is to try to remember
the story you read in the last session and your reac
tions to that story. I know it's difficult, but I can't say
much to cue your memory. Let me just remind you
that at the end of the story the womari went back to
school and is now a physiological psychologist.
In the same manner, the traditional condition was told
that the woman was thrilled about having another baby.
Memory instruction, like those in Experiment 2, em
phasized memory for initial reactions with no mention
of outcome information. Instructions for the new-re
actions condition of the instructions factor were uni
formly the following:
The first thing we want you to do is to try to remember
the story you read in the last session, and to once
again indicate your reactions to that story. Be sure to
allow your responses on the reaction form to reflect
any changes which may have occurred since your pre
vious reactions.
Twelve volunteers participated in each of the 10 cells
of the design (two crossed factors of bias timing and bias
type with two levels each, and the instructions factor
with two levels crossed with the other factors and one
level, disguised bias, nested within the delayed timing
condition only). The procedure corresponded to that .of
Experiment I in most respects. Immediate-test condi
tions were omitted. Also, the test for fact recognition
followed the reaction-memory test, to again assess pos
sible effects of outcome information on memory for
facts. The recognition test was followed by a debriefing
form containing these statements:

I. One aspect of this experiment concerns memory
for information about Donna's life. Please indicate
the most recent information you were given.
(a) She recently gave birth. (b) She returned to college.
(c) She developed an interest in psychology. (d) She
developed an interest in decorating her home.

Table

9

Mean Difference Scores (Experiment 4)
Bias timing
Instructions/bias
Memory instructions
Traditional bias
Nontraditional bias
New Reactions instructions
Traditional bias
Nontraditional bias
Disguised Bias instructions
Traditional bias
Nontraditional bias

Immediate

Delayed

-.92
3.25

-.33
1.33

-1.00
3.17

-.83
2.42
-.25
1.92

-------

Note. Data from 1 2 subjects contributed to each mean.
2. Please indicate the context in which you encoun
tered the information you checked in Item 1 .
(a) The information was presented i n the story I read.
(b) The information was presented by the experi
menter.
A correct response to Debriefing Statement 1 (alternative
a or b) should reflect memory for the biasing information
itself, whereas selection of one of the incorrect alterna
tives should indicate that either the specific outcome
described in the bias or the timing of its description (after
the passage) is not remembered; responses to Debriefing
Statement 2, especially by subjects who correctly iden
tified outcome information, should clarify what they in
terpreted "most recent" to mean. Correct responses to
both debriefing questions might provide some indication
of episodic memory for outcomes and were expected to
occur most frequently 'under memory and new-reaction
instruction, following a delayed bias. Incorrect responses
were expected in the disguised-bias condition, as a check
on the deception procedure.
In summary, subjects in the immediate-bias condition
read and reacted to the passage, heard either the tradi
tional or the nontraditional outcome, waited 3 weeks,
and then were tested for either new reactions or memory
for initial reactions. Subjects in the delayed-bias con
dition read and reacted to the story, waited 3 weeks,
returned either to hear one of the outcome biases and
to react anew, to remember old reactions following the
explicit description of a biasing outcome, or to remem
ber old reactions following a bias disguised as part of the
instructions. Finally, all subjects took the recognition
test and answered the debriefing questions (see Table 6).

Results and Discussion
Table 9 reports the mean difference scores
in each of the l 0 cells of the design. Because
of missing cells, these results were analyzed
as two separate designs, one to compare new
reaction instructions with memory instruc
tions in each combination of bias timing and
bias type (the top four rows of Table 9) and
the dther to examine differences among all
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Table l O
Number of Correct Responses o n the Debriefing
Form in Each Condition of Bias Timing and
Instructions (Experiment 4)
Bias timing
Instructions

Delayed

Immediate
Statement 1:
Identifying
most recent information

Memory
New reactions
Disguised bias

22
19
12

16
14

Statement 2:
Identifying source
(given correct on Statement 1)
Memory
New reactions
Disguised bias

22
18
8

12
11

Note. The data were combined across bias-type condi
tions; 24 correct responses; therefore, were possible in
each combination of instruction and bias timing.

three instructional conditions within tradi
tional and nontraditional delayed-bias con
ditions only (the right column of Table 9).
Memory versus new reactions. A three
factor analysis of variance failed to indicate
a reliable interaction of timing and type with
the instructions factor, even though the pat
tern of differences suggests such an interac
tion. Following memory instructions, a re
liable bias effect was obtained under imme
diate-bias conditions only, F(1 , 88) 6.007 ,
MSe
17 .341, a finding that replicates pre
vious results. However, under instructions to
react anew, the bias effect was reliable when
delivered immediately, F(1, 88)
6.007, as
well as when delivered just prior to the sec
ond reactions, F(l , 88) 3.666. These results
indicate that outcome information does
change reactions and that the change is in
the direction previously assumed for each
bias type.3
Instructional effects for the delayed bias.
A two-factor analysis of variance did not re
veal a reliable interaction of bias type with
instructions. However, it is apparent in the
right column of Table 9 that the bias effect
under disguised conditions was not reliably
different from the effect under memory con
ditions; neither was reliable. [Employing the
=

=

=

=

new error term still produced a reliable effect
for new reactions at delayed testing, F( 1,
66) 4.790, MSe
13.273.] The lack of a
bias effect in disguised-bias conditions, of
course, may be attributed to the weakness of
the bias, yet the same must then be said about
the "disguised" bias for the facts in Experi
ments 2 and 3. Although difficult to interpret,
this lack of a reaction-bias effect still differs
from the replicated fact-bias effect. In making
the procedures more comparable, the ar
rangements of this study did not affect the
divergence of outcomes.
Responses on the debriefi ng form. Table
10 presents the number of subjects in each
condition of bias timing and instruction who
correctly identified the bias as the most re
cent information (top half) and the source
of the bias, given correct identificatio11 of
most recent (bottom half). A Pearson chi
square test of independence indicated that
subjects receiving an , immediate bias and
memory or new-reaction instructions were
less likely to correctly identify the most re
cent information than were those receiving
a delayed bias (xt
6 . 54 4 p < .025). This
manipulation check supports the notion that
episodic information about the bias is not
readily accessible after 3 weeks. Even among
the 30 subjects in immediate-bias conditions
who correctly indicated the most recent in
formation (the bias), 7 reported that it had
been presented in the story. This constitutes
fairly direct evidence for loss of episodic in
formation regarding the bias, considering
that similar errors were not made by delayed
bias subjects under memory or new-reaction
instructions.
In contrast, delayed disguised-bias subjects
were often wrong about the most recent in
formation, responding more similarly to im
mediate-bias subjects than to those in the
other delayed conditions. A chi-square test
indicated that the three delayed conditions
reliably differed in correctness on Statement
l (xt
11 .297, p < .01). In addition, 4 of
the 1 2 correct responders who had heard the
disguised bias believed it had been presented
=

=

=

,

=

3 Although identical effects of an immediate bias were
not expected for new-reaction and memory instructions,
their similarity is not surprising. After 3 weeks subjects
should not be able to differentiate between old and new
reactions.

REACTIONS AND FACTS

527

tions, information concerning additional re
actions to outcome information and how
they might differ from original reactions
might be available for some period of time
following the presentation of the outcome.
In contrast, externally generated represen
tations, such as those comprising passage
memory, are not so likely to include infor
mation about operations performed on them,
such as the storage of inferences based on
misleading statements. This line of reasoning
leads to the speculation that we pay attention
to our processing efforts when asked to think
or construct a response but not when asked
to read or listen.
What follows from the generation distinc
tion
is that available evidence concerning
General Discussion
cognitive operations can be used to make
Memory for reactions or judgments con judgments required by test conditions. When
cerning events described in a passage appar we are made to think, we remember how we
ently is susceptible to interference effects, as did it. In the present experiments, such evi
is memory for facts from the passage. How dence presumably is accessible immediately
ever, interference with reaction memory was following reaction biases and is useful in dis
achieved when 3 weeks separated the bias tinguishing old reactions from new reactions.
and test, whereas the largest effect on fact After a delay of 3 weeks, subjects no longer
memory was obtained when the bias oc appear to be able to make this distinction,
curred just prior to this delayed test. When perhaps because memory for specific opera
various aspects of instructions and testing for tions, like other kinds of episodic informa
reaction and fact memory were made more tion, is no longer accessible. Similarly, very
comparable in Experiments 3 and 4, the di little information concerning the changes in
externally generated passage memory is ac
vergent pattern of effects still held.
One possible approach for understanding cessible under any condition, according to
these differences is to focus on the nature of the present line of reasoning. The latter no
the memory representations and correspond tion is supported by the debriefing data in
ing process assumptions (cf. Anderson, 1 978). Experiments 2 and 3. Following a description
The initial processing task presumably results of the manipulation regarding passage mem
in representations of passage information ory, subjects were still unaware of having
and in representations of reactions to passage been affected by the bias. Yet their false rec
information. This distinction may require ognition of misleading information was
specification on a theoretical level, and its greatest under delayed-bias conditions. This
nature may be associated with the manner pattern of results may demonstrate a recency
in which the information is generated (cf. effect of biasing information that emerges
Jacoby, 1 978; Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, when information regarding cognitive oper1980; Slamecka & Graf, 1 978). Specifically, ations is unavailable.
Admittedly, the value of the correspon
the distinction between internally and exter
nally generated memory representations ap dence between the reaction-versus-facts dis
pears to be related to the present differences tinction and the generation distinction in
between memory for reactions and memory accounting for the present differences is not
for facts. According to Raye et al., greater strongly established. The usefulness of the
accuracy regarding internally generated rep analogy hinges on differential accessibility of
resentations can be attributed to the greater information about cognitive operations,
likelihood that they include information metamemorial information. This, of course,
about the processes that produced them. If provides a possible direction for future re
this is the case for representations of reac- search.
in the story, a result somewhat confirming
its disguise. More generally, the large number
of errors ( 1 2 of 24) in identifying most recent
information so soon after its delivery suggests
that the ruse was on target.
Recognition. Although no reliable effects
were obtained with the overall recognition
measure, correct recognition of Item 8
("Donna is basically discontent/content with
her life") was · significantly related to scores
on the initial reaction task (r = - .24, p <
.0 1 ). Larger initial reaction scores, indicating
less traditional reactions, were associated
with falsely remembering that Donna was
discontent.

·

·
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A related issue focuses on the locus of bias
generation. In the present experiments, 'the
functional bias in memory for reactions was
assumed to be reactions internally generated
by outcome information; externally provided
details served to bias fact memory.4 Perhaps
this compatibility in locus of generation is
important in obtaining bias effects, particu
larly in reaction memory. On the other hand,
considering the large body of evidence sug
gesting that internally generated inferences
lead to errors in memory for facts (cf. Brans
ford, Barclay, & Franks, 1 972), perhaps in
ternally generated "biases" will always exert
large effects, provided that information abOut
the source of the bias is not accessible.
Still another line of reasoning leading off
from the present research involves the ease
with which any source of relevant informa
tion can be inserted within or added onto the
representation of,previous information. The
nature of reaction memory may logically re
quire restructuring by biasing i!lformation,
whereas facts may directly replace or strap
onto other facts in memory, as well as re
structure or .reorganize. Potentially, the re
structuring operation could · require more
time to show a bias effect, and replacement
operations could produce immediate results.
Again, restructuring operation may produce
metamemorial effects as well as bias effects.
All these issues, and others, remain to be ad
dressed.
A final consideration in the present con
ceptualization is required for the obvious yet
important observation that reactions and
facts often differ in memorability. In most
of the cases, remembering reactions should
be an easier and more successful task than
remembering facts. To be more precise, to
the extent that reactions and judgments re
quire more cognitive effort (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1 979; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, &
Ellis, 1 979), are associated with a high degree
of internal generation (Raye et al., 1 9 80), or
involve self reference (Rogers, Kuiper, &
Kirker, 1 977), they will be remembered bet
ter than facts. This comparison, although
difficult to make in specific real-world set
tings, is quite relevant to the observation that
we report our reactions along with the facts
about events. It may be that we fill in hazy
areas in our memories for facts with easily

retrieved memories for reactions to the set
of facts as a whole. Furthermore, this line of
reasoning also suggests that a bias for reac
tion memory strengthens that memory, in its
altered form, through the very process of re-,
structuring or regenerating. In contrast, a
bias in memory for facts typically does noth
ing but impose a last-minute change.
4 The source of generating bias information is best
conceived on a continuum from internal to external. In
Experiments 2 and 3, misleading statements lead to in
ferences that are more properly identified as the biases
than are the statements themselves. However, competing
elements in the biases (two children, antiques) are ex
plicitly stated, in contrast to the unidentified elements
of the reaction biases, which are entirely generated. A
similar continuum underlies the distinction between
representations of reactions and facts.
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Appendix
Materials

Passage

2.

Donna Madison is thirty years. old and has lived
in Albuquerque for most of her life. For the last
ten years she has been married to Charles Madi
son, who has worked his way into the upper eche
lon of a small electronics firm. Donna met Charles
in college, where she was an English major inter
ested in twentieth-century American poetry.
Charles was an average student but he had strong
goals for his career. Donna was a very bright stu
dent but seemed to lack a direction in her studies.
However, she was certain that she was in love and,
since she was raised traditionally, she decided to
get married and have a family.
Charles was a graduate student at the time.
After their wedding Donna quit school and got
a job as a secretary in the Psychology Department,
in order to help support them. She worked until
Charles finished his degree and she gradually de
veloped an interest in psychology. She thought it
would help her understand herself and others
better.
Donna quit the job two months before her first
baby was born and has spent several years taking
care of her family. She now has two boys and a
girl, all under the age of seven. The five of them
live in a charming old house which they have re
modeled on weekends. Donna has taken interior
decorating courses and knows a lot about contem
porary furniture. Charles is very proud of his wife
because she is a very good mother, an excellent
hostess, and she provides a calm and well-orga
nized home. Donna is basically content with her
life.
Examples of reaction statements
1 . Form 1 : Donna doesn't feel that her husband

Form

2:

has succeeded at her expense. (neg
ative/agreement from traditional
view)
Donna probably feels that her hus
band has succeeded at her expense.
(positive/agreement from nontradi
tional view)

Form

1:

Form 2:
3.

Form

1:

Form 2:

Being a wife and mother is not the
most important thing in her life. (neg
ative/agreement from nontraditional
view)
She values her role as wife and mother
above all. (positive/agreement from
traditional view)
Donna is glad·she is able to be home
with the children while they are
young. (positive/agreement from tra
ditional view)
Staying home with preschool children
is not one of her priorities. (negative/
agreement from nontraditional view)

Neutral recognition items (Experiments 2-4)
1 . Donna has been married to Charles for (ten/

fifteen) years.
She was (an English/a History) major in col
lege.
3. Charles was (a very bright/an average) student.
4. Donna quit work (two/six) months before her
first baby was born.
5. She thought psychology would help her un
derstand (her husband/herself and others)
better.
8. Donna is basically (discontent/content) with
her life.
2.

Neutral questions (Experiment 3)
I . How many years was Donna married to

Charles?
What was Donna's major in college?
What type of student was Charles?
How many months before her first baby was
born did Donna quit work?
5. Who did Donna feel psychology would help
her understand?
8. How did Donna feel about her life?

2.
3.
4.
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